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misleading title. To those who know beforehand nothing of its contents it must suggest an outline for self-education, a sort of correspondence-course in book form; to those who are acquainted with its purpose, it must suggest a comparison with Whipple's larger work. For it is, in fact, not an outline of individual study, but an outline of the study of individuality, a guide to the teacher who wishes to acquire a sympathetic and intelligent understanding of the character, temperament, and latent possibilities of the pupil. Its aim is thus more general and its treatment more elementary than those of Whipple; it may be used in schools that do not yet possess the equipment for a formal course in mental and physical tests; even where such a course is given, it may serve, as collateral reading, to give a broad perspective; and it will be of real aid to the Normal School graduate who is called upon to conduct, with small means and with less experience, a first examination of the children under her care.

Pt. i., on the history and theory of individual study (i. e., study of individuals), is of minor importance. Pt. ii., on the practical study of individuals, and Pt. iii., on the application and results of individual study, are the really useful portions of the work. The topics discussed are health, bodily characters, measurements of the body, movements, mental traits, emotions, interests and instincts, senses and perception, memory and association, free mental activity (imagination), and purposive thinking; there follows a statement of the results obtained by the application of the methods described to two children, identical twins, brought up in the same surroundings, but grossly differentiated by the fact that the one had suffered an attack of brain fever.

A valuable feature of the book is the vocabulary of terms denoting mental traits (pp. 106-111, 118).

Justice and Happiness. By W. BENETT. Oxford, The Clarendon Press. 1911. pp. 140.

The first of the two essays which make up this little volume is concerned with the definition of Justice, and the application of the concept as defined to various social problems. All justice, the author finds, is either retributive or distributive, and the guiding principles under both heads are personal equality, and desert or equality of value. In retributive justice, rewards and punishments are governed entirely by desert, and the position of the parties before the law, by personal equality. Distributive justice is a compromise between equality of persons and equality of deserts; perhaps, more correctly (in view of the way in which the original principle of equality of desert has been obscured by history), between personal equality and personal inequality. Genetically, justice, like the social habit itself, is an immediate product of the necessities of man's position in the world; it has its root in prehuman instincts. Justice owes its steady pre-eminence among ethical values to the fact that it is by far the most important condition of freedom; and freedom may be defined as the political and social conditions which secure the greatest possible evolution of power towards the realisation of a national end, which is also ethically valuable.

From Justice the author passes to Happiness. Justice is the primary condition, not of happiness generally, but of all that makes happiness worth having; for Justice necessarily conditions freedom, freedom conditions forward evolution, and forward evolution determines the ethical value of happiness. After a psychological char-

acterisation of happiness, and a negative discussion of its intrinsic ethical value, we proceed to the question whether the pursuit of happiness, for oneself or for others, has ethical value. The outcome is again negative: "we never find happiness as a feature of any one of the concrete ideals which men set up for their reverence." In general, the end of action and the object of desire, in conduct which has an ethical value, are always distinct; the end of action is something which, in itself, is neither desirable nor undesirable; and the more completely the distinction is carried out, the higher is the value of the action.

Zur Lehre vom Gemüt. Von J. REHMKE. Zweite, durchgearbeitete Auflage. Leipzig, Dürr'sche Buchhandlung. 1911. pp. viii., 115. Price Mk. 3.00.

Professor Rehmke here outlines his systematic psychology of Feeling. Freed from the technicalities of his *Lehrbuch*, the doctrine is substantially as follows: Feeling is subjective (*zuständlich*) as opposed to presentation which is objective (*gegenständlich*), though it never appears without objective accompaniment. It is determined by the whole group of presentations, clear or obscure, that constitute the objectivity of a particular consciousness; its mode, as pleasant or unpleasant, depends upon the standard (*massgebend*) presentation, *i. e.*, upon the presentation which occupies the focus of attention; its intensity depends upon the 'affective values' of all coexistent presentations. Since it is correlated with the totality of given presentations, it cannot appear as 'mixed'; neither has it a variety of qualities, within pleasantness and unpleasantness; and though every presentation has 'affective value,' this is by no means to be confused with the doctrine of an attributive 'affective tone.' What is known as the 'coloring and shading' of feeling is a matter, not of feeling itself, but of concomitant presentation, of 'somatic sensation.' The James-Lange theory is right in its insistence that certain bodily changes are among the conditions of feeling; but it is wrong in identifying the sensations connected with these changes and the sensations connected with the 'expression' of feeling; the 'expression' results from the feeling; and the two groups of somatic sensation, concomitant and successive, must be sharply distinguished. Mood is an affective complex whose 'standard' presentation is somatic sensation. Emotion is an affective complex whose subjective side is always intensive pleasantness or unpleasantness, and whose 'concomitant' somatic sensations are also highly intensive; its 'standard' presentation is never somatic sensation. *Gemüt* is either a collective term for feelings and moods, or is the particular conscious (or psycho-physical) condition of the *Gemütszustand* (feeling, mood, etc.)

The Universities of Ancient Greece. By J. W. H. WALDEN. New York, C. Scribner's Sons, 1909. pp. xiv., 367.

The period treated in this interesting little book is the first five centuries of the Christian era; so that Greece includes, besides the Balkan peninsula and the islands of the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, Egypt and the adjoining parts of Libya, Asia Minor with Syria, Palestine and Arabia Petraea, Thrace, and Macedonia. In order to give historical perspective, a short account has been prefixed (under the headings Education at Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B. C., The Macedonian period, Education and the State) of the Athenian education in pre-Alexandrian times, and of the conditions